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The voting rules proposed by Dodgson and Young are both designed to ﬁnd an alternative
closest to being a Condorcet winner, according to two different notions of proximity; the
score of a given alternative is known to be hard to compute under either rule. In this paper,
we put forward two algorithms for approximating the Dodgson score: a combinatorial,
greedy algorithm and an LP-based algorithm, both of which yield an approximation ratio of
Hm−1, where m is the number of alternatives and Hm−1 is the (m−1)st harmonic number.
We also prove that our algorithms are optimal within a factor of 2, unless problems in
NP have quasi-polynomial-time algorithms. Despite the intuitive appeal of the greedy
algorithm, we argue that the LP-based algorithm has an advantage from a social choice
point of view. Further, we demonstrate that computing any reasonable approximation of
the ranking produced by Dodgson’s rule is NP-hard. This result provides a complexity-
theoretic explanation of sharp discrepancies that have been observed in the social choice
theory literature when comparing Dodgson elections with simpler voting rules. Finally, we
show that the problem of calculating the Young score is NP-hard to approximate by any
factor. This leads to an inapproximability result for the Young ranking.
© 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The discipline of voting theory deals with the following setting: there is a group of n agents and each of them ranks a
set of m alternatives; one alternative is to be elected. The big question is: which alternative best reﬂects the social good?
This question is fundamental to the study of multiagent systems, because the agents of such a system often need to
combine their individual objectives into a single output or decision that best reﬂects the aggregate needs of all the agents
in the system. For instance, web meta-search engines [12] and recommender systems [21] have used methods based on
voting theory.
Reﬂecting on this question, the French philosopher and mathematician Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas de Caritat, marquis de
Condorcet, suggested the following intuitive criterion: the winner should be an alternative that beats every other alternative
✩ A preliminary version of the results in this paper appeared in the Proceedings of the 20th Annual ACM–SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA’09).
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fairly easy to see that the preferences of the majority may be cyclic, hence a Condorcet winner does not necessarily exist.
This unfortunate phenomenon is known as the Condorcet paradox (see Black [5]).
In order to circumvent this result, several researchers have proposed choosing an alternative that is “as close as pos-
sible” to a Condorcet winner. Different notions of proximity can be considered, and yield different voting rules. One such
suggestion was advocated by Charles Dodgson, better known by his pen name Lewis Carroll, author of “Alice’s Adventures
in Wonderland.” The Dodgson score [5] of an alternative, with respect to a given set of agents’ preferences, is the minimum
number of exchanges between adjacent alternatives in the agents’ rankings one has to introduce in order to make the given
alternative a Condorcet winner. A Dodgson winner is any alternative with a minimum Dodgson score.
Young [45] raised a second option: measuring the distance by agents. Speciﬁcally, the Young score of an alternative is the
size of the largest subset of agents such that, if only these ballots are taken into account, the given alternative becomes
a Condorcet winner. A Young winner is any alternative with the maximum Young score. Alternatively, one can perceive a
Young winner as the alternative that becomes a Condorcet winner by removing the fewest agents.
Though these two voting rules sound appealing and straightforward, they have been criticized because they fail to meet
several well-studied classical fairness criteria [18,6]. However, impossibility results tell us that every voting rule likewise
fails to satisfy some such criterion. Thus, there is no hope of ﬁnding a voting rule that is perfect for all situations. Instead,
social choice theory has advanced our understanding of an ever-increasing body of voting rules, each of which has unique
features, virtues, and vices. Practitioners can choose from this body whichever rules best apply to their particular situations.
Dodgson and Young voting are two such rules, as are the two approximation algorithms introduced later in this article.
A less ambiguous drawback of Dodgson and Young voting is that they are notoriously complicated to resolve. As early as
1989, Bartholdi, Tovey and Trick [2] showed that the Dodgson score decision problem is NP-complete, and that pinpointing
a Dodgson winner is NP-hard. This important paper was one of the ﬁrst to introduce complexity-theoretic considerations
to social choice theory. Hemaspaandra et al. [23] reﬁned the aforementioned result by showing that the Dodgson winner
decision problem is complete for Θ p2 , the class of problems that can be solved by O(logn) queries to an NP set. Subse-
quently, Rothe et al. [41] proved that the Young winner problem is also complete for Θ p2 .
These complexity-theoretic results give rise to the agenda of approximately calculating an alternative’s score, under the
Dodgson and Young schemes. This is clearly an interesting computational problem, as an application area of algorithmic
techniques.
However, from the point of view of social choice theory, it is not immediately apparent that an approximation of a
voting rule is satisfactory, since an “incorrect” alternative—in our case, one that is not closest to a Condorcet winner—might
be elected. The key insight is that an approximation of a voting rule is a voting rule in its own right, and in some cases one
can argue that this new voting rule has desirable properties. We discuss this point at length, and justify our approach, in
Section 7.
1.1. Our results
In the context of approximating the Dodgson score, we devise a greedy algorithm for the Dodgson score which has an
approximation ratio of Hm−1, where m is the number of alternatives and Hm−1 is the (m − 1)st harmonic number. We
then propose a second algorithm that is based on solving a linear programming relaxation of the Dodgson score and has
the same approximation ratio. Although the former algorithm gives us a better intuition into the combinatorial structure
of the problem, we show that the latter has the advantage of being score monotonic, which is a desirable property from
a social choice point of view. We further observe that it follows from the work of McCabe-Dansted [30] that the Dodgson
score cannot be approximated within sublogarithmic factors by polynomial-time algorithms unless P = NP . We prove a
more explicit inapproximability result of (1/2− ) lnm, under the assumption that problems in NP do not have algorithms
running in quasi-polynomial time; this implies that the approximation ratio achieved by our algorithms is optimal up to a
factor of 2.
A number of recent papers [38,39,27–29] have established that there are sharp discrepancies between the Dodgson
ranking and the rankings produced by other rank aggregation rules. Some of these rules (e.g., Borda and Copeland) are
polynomial-time computable, so the corresponding results can be viewed as negative results regarding the approximability
of the Dodgson ranking by polynomial-time algorithms. We show that the problem of distinguishing between whether a
given alternative is the unique Dodgson winner or in the last O (
√
m) positions in any Dodgson ranking is NP-hard. This
theorem provides a complexity-theoretic explanation for some of the observed discrepancies, but in fact is much wider in
scope as it applies to any eﬃciently computable rank aggregation rule.
At ﬁrst glance, the problem of calculating the Young score seems simple compared with the Dodgson score (we discuss
in Section 6 why this seems so). Therefore, we found the following result quite surprising: it is NP-hard to approximate the
Young score within any factor. Speciﬁcally, we show that it is NP-hard to distinguish between the case where the Young
score of a given alternative is 0, and the case where the score is greater than 0. As a corollary we obtain an inapproximability
result for the Young ranking. We also show that it is NP-hard to approximate the dual Young score within O (n1−), for
any constant  > 0. We deﬁne the dual Young score below in the preliminaries section.
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The agenda of approximating voting rules was recently pursued by Ailon et al. [1], Coppersmith et al. [10], and Kenyon-
Mathieu and Schudy [26]. These papers deal, directly or indirectly, with the Kemeny rank aggregation rule, which chooses
a ranking of the alternatives instead of a single winning alternative. The Kemeny rule picks the ranking that has the maxi-
mum number of agreements with the agents’ individual rankings regarding the correct order of pairs of alternatives. Ailon et
al. improve the trivial 2-approximation algorithm to an involved, randomized algorithm that gives an 11/7-approximation;
Kenyon-Mathieu and Schudy further improve the approximation, and obtain a polynomial-time approximation scheme
(PTAS).
Two recent papers study the approximability of Dodgson elections; both papers appeared after the conference version
of the current paper. Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, and Hemaspaandra show that minimax as a scoring rule is an m2 approx-
imation of the Dodgson score [16]. Caragiannis et al. [7] give a number of algorithms that approximate to Dodgson score
and also have nice fairness properties, such as homogeneity and monotonicity, but whose approximations are either asymp-
totically worse than ours or not polynomial-time computable. Moreover, their approximation algorithms are much more
complex, both descriptionally and in running time. They also provide upper bounds such that any score-based voting rule
whose scoring rule approximates Dodgson scoring to within the bounds fails to meet certain fairness criteria. In Section 4
we discuss further the latter results.
Two recent papers have directly put forward algorithms for the Dodgson winner problem [24,32]. Both papers indepen-
dently build upon the same basic idea: if the number of agents is signiﬁcantly larger than the number of alternatives, and
one looks at a uniform distribution over the preferences of the agents, with high probability one obtains an instance on
which it is trivial to compute the Dodgson score of a given alternative. This directly gives rise to an algorithm that can
usually compute the Dodgson score (under the assumption on the number of agents and alternatives). However, this is
not an approximation algorithm in the usual sense, since the algorithm a priori gives up on certain instances,1 whereas an
approximation algorithm is judged by its worst-case guarantees. In addition, this algorithm would be useless if the number
of alternatives is not small compared with the number of agents.2
In a similar vein, McCabe-Dansted [31] suggested several new variations on Dodgson’s rule. These rules are shown to
give an additive approximation to the Dodgson score. Speciﬁcally, they can underestimate the score by an additive term of
at most (m−1)!(m−1)e, where m is the number of alternatives. We note that this result would only be meaningful if there
are very few alternatives, and in addition it does not provide the tight worst-case multiplicative guarantees that we achieve
in this paper. McCabe-Dansted further shows that, similarly to the rules discussed above, the new rules usually select the
Dodgson winner under certain distributions.
Betzler et al. [4] have investigated the parameterized computational complexity of the Dodgson and Young rules. The
authors have devised a ﬁxed parameter algorithm for exact computation of the Dodgson score, where the ﬁxed parameter
is the “edit distance”, i.e., the number of exchanges. Speciﬁcally, if k is an upper bound on the Dodgson score of a given
alternative, n is the number of agents, and m the number of alternatives, the algorithm runs in time O(2k ·nk+nm). Notice
that in general it may hold that k = Ω(nm). In contrast, the Young score decision problem is W [2]-complete; this implies
that there is no algorithm that computes the Young score exactly, and whose running time is polynomial in nm and only
exponential in k, where the parameter k is the number of remaining votes. These results complement ours nicely, as we
shall also demonstrate that computing the Dodgson score is in a sense easier than computing the Young score, albeit in the
context of approximation.
Putting computational complexity aside, some research by social choice theorists has considered comparing the ranking
produced by Dodgson, i.e., the ordering of the alternatives by nondecreasing Dodgson score, with elections based on simpler
voting rules. Such comparisons have always revealed sharp discrepancies. For example, the Dodgson winner can appear in
any position in the Kemeny ranking [38] and in the ranking of any positional scoring rule [39] (e.g., Borda or Plurality),
Dodgson rankings can be exactly the opposite of Borda [29] and Copeland rankings [27], while the winner of Kemeny or
Slater elections can appear in any position of the Dodgson ranking [28].
More distantly related to our work is research that is concerned with exactly resolving hard-to-compute voting rules
by heuristic methods. Typical examples include papers regarding the Kemeny rule [9] and the Slater rule [8]. Another more
remotely related ﬁeld of research is concerned with ﬁnding approximate, eﬃcient representations of voting rules, by eliciting
as little information as possible; this line of research employs techniques from learning theory [36].
1 Technically speaking, this algorithm correctly computes the Dodgson score in worst-case polynomial time, but only when the domain is restricted to
those instances on which the algorithm does not give up, and there does not seem to be a characterization of this domain restriction that does not refer in
a fairly direct way back to the algorithm itself. Thus, in many natural settings one cannot before an election is held guarantee that the algorithm will work.
2 This would normally not happen in political elections, but can certainly be the case in many other settings. For instance, consider a group of agents
trying to reach an agreement on a joint plan, when multiple alternative plans are available. Speciﬁcally, think of a group of investors deciding which
company to invest in.
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In Section 2, we introduce some notations and deﬁnitions. In Section 3, we present our upper bounds for approximating
the Dodgson score. We study the monotonicity properties of our algorithms in Section 4. In Section 5, we present our lower
bounds for approximating the Dodgson score and ranking. In Section 6, we prove that the Young score, dual Young score,
and Young ranking are inapproximable. Finally, we discuss our approach in Section 7.
2. Preliminaries
Let N = {1, . . . ,n} be a set of agents, and let A be a set of alternatives. We denote |A| by m, and denote the alternatives
themselves by letters, such as a ∈ A. Indices referring to agents appear in superscript. Each agent i ∈ N holds a binary
relation Ri over A that satisﬁes antisymmetry, transitivity and totality. Informally, Ri is a ranking of the alternatives. Let
L = L(A) be the set of all rankings over A; we have that each Ri ∈ L. We denote RN = 〈R1, . . . , Rn〉 ∈ LN , and refer to
this vector as a preference proﬁle. We may also use Q i to denote the preferences of agent i, in cases where we want to
distinguish between two different rankings Ri and Q i . For sets of alternatives B1, B2 ⊆ A, we write B1Ri B2 if for all a ∈ B1
and b ∈ B2, aRib. If B1 = {a} (respectively, B2 = {a}) for some a, we sometimes write aRi B2 (respectively, B1Ria) instead of
{a}Ri B2 (respectively, B1Ri{a}).
Let a,b ∈ A. Denote P (a,b) = {i ∈ N: aRib}. We say that a beats b in a pairwise election if |P (a,b)| > n/2, that is, a is
preferred to b by a majority of agents. A Condorcet winner is an alternative that beats every other alternative in a pairwise
election.
The Dodgson score of a given alternative a∗ , with respect to a given preference proﬁle RN , is the least number of
exchanges between adjacent alternatives in RN needed to make a∗ a Condorcet winner. For instance, let N = {1,2,3},
A = {a,b, c}, and let RN be given by:
R1 R2 R3
a b a
b a c
c c b
where the top alternative in each column is the most preferred one.
In this example, the Dodgson score of a is 0 (a is a Condorcet winner), the Dodgson score of b is 1, and the Dodgson
score of c is 3. Bartholdi et al. [2] have shown that the Dodgson score decision problem—the problem of determining, for
a given preference proﬁle RN , alternative a, and natural number k, whether the Dodgson score of a in RN is at most k—is
NP-complete.
The Young score of a∗ with respect to RN is the size of a largest subset of agents for whom a∗ is a Condorcet winner.
This is the deﬁnition given by Young himself [45], and used in subsequent articles [41]. If, for every nonempty subset of
agents, a∗ is not a Condorcet winner, its Young score is 0. In the above example, the Young score of a is 3, the Young score
of b is 1, and the Young score of c is 0.
Equivalently, a Young winner is an alternative such that one has to remove the minimum number of agents in order to
make it a Condorcet winner. We call this number the dual Young score. Note that, in the context of approximation, these
two deﬁnitions are not equivalent; we employ the former (original, prevalent) deﬁnition, but touch on the latter as well.
As the decision problem version of the Young winner problem (the decision problem is to determine, given a preference
proﬁle and an alternative a, whether a is the Young winner in that proﬁle) is known to be Θ P2 -complete [41], and thusNP-hard, the Young score problem must also be hard; otherwise, we would be able to calculate the scores of all the
alternatives eﬃciently, and identify the alternatives with minimum score.
Linear and integer programs are fundamental tools for solving optimization problems. See Cormen et al. [11] for a nice
introduction to the subject from a computer science perspective, which we summarize here. A linear program in its canonical
form consists of, for some p,q ∈ N, a p × q matrix M , a p-vector A and a q-vector B , and seeks to ﬁnd a q-vector that
maximizes BX (called the objective function) subject to the constraints MX  A, where any X satisfying the constraints
(though which may not necessarily be a maximum) is called feasible. An integer linear program is a linear program with the
additional restriction that X may only take integral values. As is commonly done, we will often write the linear programs we
use as seeking to minimize rather than maximize the objective function, and express some of the constraints as lower rather
than upper bounds. Through simple algebraic manipulation, these expressions can always be translated into equivalent ones
that are in the canonical form deﬁned above.
For a linear program in the form given above, its dual is the linear program deﬁned as the problem of ﬁnding a p-vector
Y  0 that minimizes AY subject to the constraints MTY  B (where MT is the transpose of M). It is easy to see that B X
of any feasible solution X to the original problem (known as the primal linear program) is a lower bound on AY of any
feasible solution Y to its dual (or vice versa if the primal is expressed as a minimization problem), so X and Y are optimal
solutions to their respective problems whenever AY = B X . The converse is also true, though not as easy to see, and plays a
fundamental role in the analysis of algorithms for solving linear programs. We will use this fact in the paper.
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b b c
d1 d4 b
d2 d5 d6
c a∗ d7
d3 c d8
a∗ d1 a∗
d4 d2 d1
d5 d3 d2
d6 d6 d3
d7 d7 d4
d8 d8 d5
(a) Initial proﬁle.
R1 R2 R3
b b c
d1 d4 b
d2 d5 d6
a∗ a∗ d7
c c d8
d3 d1 a∗
d4 d2 d1
d5 d3 d2
d6 d6 d3
d7 d7 d4
d8 d8 d5
(b) After step 1.
R1 R2 R3
b a∗ c
d1 b b
d2 d4 d6
a∗ d5 d7
c c d8
d3 d1 a∗
d4 d2 d1
d5 d3 d2
d6 d6 d3
d7 d7 d4
d8 d8 d5
(c) After step 2.
R1 R2 R3
b a∗ c
d1 b a∗
d2 d4 b
a∗ d5 d6
c c d7
d3 d1 d8
d4 d2 d1
d5 d3 d2
d6 d6 d3
d7 d7 d4
d8 d8 d5
(d) After step 3.
Fig. 1. An example of the execution of the greedy algorithm.
Linear programs are widely used by engineers and computer scientists to solve a wide range of problems. They can be
solved in polynomial time, though the degrees of these polynomials are so high that in practice worst-case superpolynomial-
time algorithms are used instead.
3. Approximability of Dodgson scores
We begin by presenting our approximation algorithms for the Dodgson score. Let us ﬁrst introduce some notation.
Let a∗ ∈ A be a distinguished alternative, whose Dodgson score we wish to compute. Deﬁne the deﬁcit of a∗ with respect
to a ∈ A, simply denoted def(a) when the identity of a∗ is clear, as the number of additional agents i whose ranking relation
Ri must be changed from to aRia∗ to a∗Ria in order for a∗ to beat a in a pairwise election. Equivalently,
def(a) = max{0,1+ n/2	 − P(a∗,a)}.
For instance, if four agents prefer a to a∗ and only one agent prefers a∗ to a, then def(a) = 2. If a∗ beats a in a pairwise
election (namely a∗ is preferred to a by a majority of agents) then def(a) = 0. We say that alternatives a ∈ A with def(a) > 0
are alive. Alternatives that are not alive, i.e., those with def(a) = 0, are dead.
3.1. A greedy algorithm
In this section we present a combinatorial, greedy algorithm for approximating the Dodgson score of a given alternative.
Consider, once again, a special alternative a∗ , and recall that a live alternative is one with a positive deﬁcit. In each step, the
algorithm selects an optimally cost-effective push of alternative a∗ in the preference of some agent. The cost-effectiveness of
pushing a∗ in the preference of an agent i ∈ N is the ratio between the total number of positions a∗ is moved upwards in
the preference of i compared with the original proﬁle RN , and the number of currently live alternatives that a∗ overtakes as a
result of this push.
After selecting an optimally cost-effective push, i.e., the push with the lowest cost-effectiveness, the algorithm decreases
def(a) by one for each live alternative a that a∗ overtakes. Alternatives a ∈ A with def(a) = 0 become dead. The algorithm
terminates when no live alternatives remain. The output of the algorithm is the total number of positions that alternative
a∗ is pushed upwards in the preferences of all agents.
Greedy algorithm:
1. Let A′ be the set of live alternatives, namely those alternatives a ∈ A with def(a) > 0.
2. While A′ = ∅:
• Perform an optimally cost-effective push, namely push a∗ in the preferences of agent i ∈ N in a way that minimizes
the ratio between the total number of positions that a∗ moves upwards in the preferences of i and the number of
currently live alternatives that a∗ overtakes as a result of this push.
• Recalculate A′ .
3. Return the number of exchanges performed.
An example of the execution of the algorithm is depicted in Fig. 1 (see also Fig. 2 and the related discussion in Section 4).
In the initial proﬁle of this example, alternative a∗ has deﬁcits def(b) = 2, def(c) = 1, and def(di) = 0. Hence, alternatives
b and c are alive and alternatives d1, . . . ,d8 are dead. At the ﬁrst step of the algorithm, there are several different ways of
pushing alternative a∗ upwards in order to overtake one of the live alternatives b and c or both. Among them, the one with
the smallest cost-effectiveness is to push a∗ upwards in the preference R1. In this way, a∗ moves two positions upwards and
overtakes the live alternative c for a cost-effectiveness of 2. Any other push of a∗ in the initial proﬁle has cost-effectiveness
at least 2.5 since a∗ has to be pushed at least three positions upwards in order to overtake one live alternative and at least
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ways to push alternative a∗ upwards so that it overtakes the live alternative b: either pushing it at the top of R1 (this has
cost effectiveness 5 because a∗ would have moved ﬁve positions in total compared to the initial proﬁle in R1), or pushing
it at the top of R2 (with cost-effectiveness 3), or pushing it four positions upwards in R3 (with cost-effectiveness 4). The
algorithm picks the second option. Then, in step 3, the algorithm can either push alternative a∗ at the top position of R1 or
push it four positions upwards in R3. The former has a cost-effectiveness of 5 (recall that cost-effectiveness is deﬁned using
the total number of positions a∗ would move compared to its position at the initial proﬁle) while the latter has a cost-
effectiveness of 4 and is the push the algorithm picks. After step 3, all alternatives are dead and the algorithm terminates
by returning the total number of positions a∗ is pushed upwards, i.e., 9.
By the deﬁnition of the algorithm, it is clear that it produces a proﬁle where a∗ is a Condorcet winner. It is important
to notice that if a∗ is initially a Condorcet winner then the algorithm calculates a score of zero, so as a voting rule the
algorithm satisﬁes the Condorcet criterion. Also, during each iteration of line 2 an optimally cost-effective push may not
be unique, in which case the algorithm chooses, in a manner that does not affect our approximation results, exactly one of
these optimally cost-effective pushes.
Theorem 3.1. For any input a∗ and RN with m alternatives, the greedy algorithm returns an Hm−1-approximation of the Dodgson
score of a∗ , where for all natural numbers k, Hk =∑ki=1 1k is the k-th harmonic number.
Proof. We base our proof on the connection between our problem and the Constrained SetMulticover problem, for which
Rajagopalan and Vazirani [37] give an approximation algorithm and use the dual ﬁtting technique to prove its approximation
ratio (see also [44, pp. 112–116]).
Constrained Set Multicover
Instance:A ground set A, a set of integers {ra}a∈A , one for each element of a ∈ A, representing the covering requirement for a,
an indexed collection S = {S j | S j ⊆ A} of subsets of A (crucially, the same subset may occur more than once in this
collection, as long as each copy has a distinct index), and a set of integers {cS j }, one for each member of S , representing
the cost of that member.
Question: What is the smallest number c¯ for which there is a subcollection C of S such that
1. c¯ =∑S j∈C cS j ,
2. each member of S appears at most once in C , and
3. each element a ∈ A appears in at least ra members of C?
We may view the problem of approximating the Dodgson score as a variation of Constrained Set Multicover. The
ground set is the set of live alternatives. For each live alternative a ∈ A \ {a∗}, its deﬁcit def(a) is in fact its covering
requirement, i.e., the number of different sets it has to belong to in the ﬁnal cover. For each agent i ∈ N that ranks a∗ in
place ri , we have a group S i consisting of the sets Sik for k = 1, . . . , ri − 1, where the set Sik contains the (initially) live
alternatives that appear in positions ri − k to ri − 1 in the preference of agent i. The set Sik has cost k. Now, the covering
problem to be solved is the following. We wish to select at most one set from each of the different groups so that each
alternative a ∈ A \ {a∗} appears in at least def(a) sets and the total cost of the selected sets is minimized. The optimal cost
is the Dodgson score of a∗ and, hence, the cost of any approximate cover that satisﬁes the covering requirements and the
constraints is an upper bound on the Dodgson score.
We can thus deﬁne this covering problem as:
Set Multicover with Group Constraints
Instance:A ground set A, a set of integers {ra}a∈A , one for each element of a ∈ A, a collection S = {S j | S j ⊆ A} of subsets
of A, a set of integers {cS j }, and a partitioning of S into groups S i for i ∈ N .
Question: What is the smallest number c¯ for which there is a subcollection C of S such that
1. c¯ =∑S j∈C cS j ,
2. each member of S appears at most once in C ,
3. each element a ∈ A appears in at least ra members of C , and
4. at most one member from each group S i appears in C?
In terms of this covering problem, the greedy algorithm mentioned above can be thought of as follows. In each step,
it selects an optimally cost-effective set where the cost-effectiveness of a set is deﬁned as the ratio between the cost of
the set and the number of live alternatives it covers that have not been previously covered by sets belonging to the same
group. For these live alternatives, the algorithm decreases their covering requirements at the end of the step. The algorithm
terminates when all alternatives have died (i.e., their covering requirement has become zero). The output of the algorithm
consists of the maximum-cost sets that were picked from each group.
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minimize
∑
i∈N
ri−1∑
k=1
k · xSik
subject to ∀a ∈ A \ {a∗}, ∑
i∈N
∑
S∈S i : a∈S
xS  def(a)
∀i ∈ N,
∑
S∈S i
xS  1
x ∈ {0,1}.
The variable xS associated with a set S denotes whether S is included in the solution (xS = 1) or not (xS = 0). We relax
the integrality constraint in order to obtain a linear programming relaxation and we compute its dual linear program.
maximize
∑
a∈A\{a∗}
def(a) · ya −
∑
i∈N
zi
subject to ∀i ∈ N,k = 1, . . . , ri − 1,
∑
a∈Sik
ya − zi  k
∀i ∈ N, zi  0
∀a ∈ A \ {a∗}, ya  0.
For a set S that is picked by the algorithm to cover alternative a ∈ A \ {a∗} for the j-th time (the j-th copy of a), we set
p(a, j) to be equal to the cost-effectiveness of S when it is picked. Informally, p distributes equally the cost of S among
the copies of the live alternatives it covers. When the algorithm covers a live alternative a by picking a set S that belongs
to group S i , we use the notation ji(a) to denote the index of the copy of a the algorithm covers by picking this set. Denote
by T i the set of live alternatives covered by the sets of group S i that are picked by the algorithm throughout its execution.
Now, we shall show that by setting
ya = p(a,def(a))
Hm−1
for each alternative a ∈ A \ {a∗} and
zi = 1
Hm−1
∑
a∈T i
(
p
(
a,def(a)
)− p(a, ji(a)))
for each agent i ∈ N , the constraints of the dual linear program are satisﬁed. The variables ya are clearly non-negative.
Since the algorithm picks a set of optimal cost-effectiveness at each step, the cost-effectiveness of the set picked does not
decrease with time. Hence, p(a,def(a)) p(a, j) for every alternative a with def(a) > 0 and j  def(a). This implies that zi
is non-negative as well.
In order to show that the ﬁrst constraint of the dual linear program is also satisﬁed, consider an agent i ∈ N and integer
k such that 1 k ri − 1. We have
∑
a∈Sik
ya − zi = 1
Hm−1
[∑
a∈Sik
p
(
a,def(a)
)− ∑
a∈T i
(
p
(
a,def(a)
)− p(a, ji(a)))
]
 1
Hm−1
[∑
a∈Sik
p
(
a,def(a)
)− ∑
a∈Sik∩T i
(
p
(
a,def(a)
)− p(a, ji(a)))
]
= 1
Hm−1
[ ∑
a∈Sik\T i
p
(
a,def(a)
)+ ∑
a∈Sik∩T i
p
(
a, ji(a)
)]
. (1)
Now, for each alternative a ∈ Sik , we deﬁne ν(a) as follows. If a ∈ Sik ∩ T i , ν(a) is the time step in which the algorithm
covered alternative a by picking a set of group S i . Otherwise, if a ∈ Sik \ T i , ν(a) is the time step in which alternative a
died. Now, number the alternatives in Sik in nondecreasing order of ν(·), breaking ties arbitrarily. Let a1,a2, . . . ,a|Sik| be this
order. Consider alternative at with 1 t  |Sik|. Observe that, due to the deﬁnition of the order of alternatives in Sik , after
step ν(at) is performed, the alternatives at ,at+1, . . . ,a i have not died yet and the sets of group S i that have been picked|Sk |
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of cost k in order to cover at least these |Sik| − t + 1 alternatives. So, the cost-effectiveness of the set that is actually picked
by the algorithm at step ν(at) is at most k|Sik |−t+1
. This argument implies that
p
(
at, ji(at)
)
 k|Sik| − t + 1
(2)
if at ∈ Sik ∩ T i , and
p
(
at,def(at)
)
 k|Sik| − t + 1
(3)
otherwise (if at ∈ Sik \ T i ).
Using (2) and (3) together with (1), we obtain that
∑
a∈Sik
ya − zi  1
Hm−1
|Sik|∑
t=1
k
|Sik| − t + 1
=
kH |Sik|
Hm−1
 k,
implying that the constraints of the dual linear program are always satisﬁed. The last inequality follows since, obviously,
|Sik|m − 1.
Now, denote by OPT the optimal objective value of the integer linear program. By duality, we have that any feasible
solution to the dual of its linear programming relaxation has objective value at most OPT. Hence,
Hm−1 · OPT Hm−1
( ∑
a∈A\{a∗}
def(a) · ya −
∑
i∈N
zi
)
=
∑
a∈A\{a∗}
def(a) · p(a,def(a))−∑
i∈N
∑
a∈T i
(
p
(
a,def(a)
)− p(a, ji(a)))
=
∑
i∈N
∑
a∈T i
p
(
a, ji(a)
)
.
The theorem follows since the last expression is equal to the total cost of the sets picked at all steps of the algorithm and
clearly upper-bounds the cost of the ﬁnal solution. 
3.2. An LP-based algorithm
The analysis of the greedy algorithm suggests an LP-based algorithm for approximating the Dodgson score of an alter-
native a∗ without explicitly providing a way to push a∗ upwards in the preference of some agents so that a∗ becomes the
Condorcet winner. This algorithm uses the same LP relaxation of the Dodgson score that was used in the analysis of the
greedy algorithm. The algorithm computes the optimal objective value, and returns this value multiplied by Hm−1 as a score
of the alternative a∗ . The idea that the relaxation of the ILP for the Dodgson score induces a rule that is similar to Dodgson
is not new (see, e.g., [30]).
For completeness, we reformulate the LP in a more detailed form that takes the preference proﬁle as a parameter as
well; this shall be useful in the following section, where we discuss the monotonicity properties of the algorithm. Given a
proﬁle R = RN with a set of agents N and a set of m alternatives A, we denote by ri(R) the rank of alternative a∗ in the
preference of agent i. We use the notation def(a, R) for the deﬁcit of a∗ against an alternative a in the proﬁle R . Recall that
alternatives a ∈ A \ {a∗} such that def(a, R) > 0 are said to be alive. For every agent i ∈ N that ranks a∗ in place ri(R), we
denote by S i(R) the subcollection that consists of the sets Sik(R) for k = 1, . . . , ri(R) − 1, where the set Sik(R) contains the
live alternatives that appear in positions ri(R) − k to ri(R) − 1 in the preference of agent i. We denote by S(R) the union
of the subcollections S i(R) for i ∈ N .
The LP-based algorithm uses the following LP relaxation of the Dodgson score of alternative a∗ in the proﬁle R:
minimize
∑
i∈N
ri(R)−1∑
k=1
k · xSik(R)
subject to ∀a ∈ A \ {a∗}, ∑
i∈N
∑
S∈S i(R): a∈S
xS  def(a, R)
∀i ∈ N,
∑
S∈S i(R)
xS  1
∀S ∈ S(R), 0 xS  1.
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calculates a score of zero. In any other case, we can easily show that the score returned by the algorithm is between
the Dodgson score of alternative a∗ and its Dodgson score multiplied by Hm−1. Indeed, by the analysis in the proof of
Theorem 3.1 (see the last derivation), we know that the score returned by the greedy algorithm and, consequently, the
Dodgson score of a∗ is not higher than the optimal objective value of the LP relaxation multiplied by Hm−1. Furthermore,
since the optimal objective value of the LP relaxation is a lower bound on the Dodgson score of a∗ , the LP-based algorithm
returns a score that is an Hm−1-approximation of the Dodgson score. This is formalized in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.2. For any input a∗ and RN with m alternatives, the LP-based algorithm returns an Hm−1-approximation of the Dodgson
score of a∗ .
4. Interlude: on the desirability of approximation algorithms as voting rules
So far we have looked at Dodgson approximations through the algorithmic lens. We now wish to brieﬂy explore the
social choice point of view. We argue that a Dodgson approximation is equivalent to a new voting rule, which is guaranteed
to elect an alternative that is not far from being a Condorcet winner. In other words, a perfectly sensible deﬁnition of a
“socially good” winner, given the circumstances, is simply the alternative chosen by the approximation algorithm. Note that
the approximation algorithm can be designed to satisfy the Condorcet criterion, i.e., always elect a Condorcet winner if one
exists. Since the Dodgson score of a Condorcet winner is zero, choosing such a winner when one exists has no impact on
the approximation ratio.
Our approximation algorithms should therefore be compared according to two conceptually different, but not orthogonal,
dimensions: their algorithmic properties and their social choice properties. From an algorithmic point of view, the greedy
algorithm gives us a better sense of the combinatorial structure of the problem. In the sequel we suggest, however, that the
LP-based algorithm has some desirable properties from the social choice point of view.
In most algorithmic mechanism design settings [34], such as combinatorial auctions or scheduling, one usually seeks
approximation algorithms that are truthful, i.e., the agents cannot beneﬁt by lying. However, the well-known Gibbard–
Satterthwaite Theorem [22,42] precludes voting rules that are both truthful and reasonable, in a sense. Therefore, other
desiderata are looked for in voting rules. (Of course, other social choice properties are interesting to look at in their own
right, independent of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem).
Let us reiterate that both the greedy algorithm and the LP-based algorithm satisfy the Condorcet property. Let us now
consider the monotonicity property, one of the major desiderata on the basis of which voting rules are compared. Many
different notions of monotonicity can be found in the literature; for our purposes, a (score-based) voting rule is score
monotonic if and only if making an alternative more preferable in the rankings of some agent cannot worsen the score of
the alternative, that is, increase it when a lower score is desirable (as in Dodgson), or decrease it when a higher score is
desirable. All prominent score-based voting rules (e.g., positional scoring rules, Copeland, Maximin) are score monotonic; it
is straightforward to see that the Dodgson and Young rules are score monotonic as well.
We ﬁrst claim that our LP-based algorithm is score monotonic.
Theorem 4.1. The LP-based algorithm is score monotonic.
Proof. We will consider two different inputs to the LP-based algorithm for computing the score of an alternative a∗: one
with a proﬁle R = RN and another with a proﬁle R¯ that is obtained from R by pushing alternative a∗ upwards in the
preferences of some of the agents (abusing notation somewhat, we will sometimes let R , respectively R¯ , denote the input
having proﬁle R , respectively R¯). Given an optimal solution x for R , we will construct a feasible solution x¯ for R¯ that does
not exceed x. This is a suﬃcient condition for the assertion of the theorem.
By the deﬁnition of proﬁle R¯ , it holds that ri(R)  ri(R¯) for every i ∈ N . We partition the subcollection S i(R) into the
following two disjoint subcollections:
S i,1(R) = {Sik(R): k = ri(R) − ri(R¯) + 1, . . . , ri(R) − 1}
and
S i,2(R) = {Sik(R): k = 1, . . . , ri(R) − ri(R¯)}.
For every i ∈ N , there is a one-to-one and onto correspondence between the sets in S i(R¯) and the sets in S i,1(R), where
for k ∈ {1, . . . , ri(R¯)} the set Sik(R¯) of S i(R¯) corresponds to the set Sik+ri(R)−ri(R¯)(R) of S i,1(R) and vice versa. The solution
x¯ for the second input is constructed by simply setting
x¯Sik(R¯)
= xSi
k+ri (R)−ri (R¯)(R)
for i ∈ N and k ∈ {1, . . . , ri(R¯) − 1}.
40 I. Caragiannis et al. / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 187–188 (2012) 31–51R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6
a4 a4 a4 a3 a2 a1
a3 a3 b4 b9 b13 b16
a2 a2 b5 b10 b14 b17
a1 a1 b6 b11 b15 a∗
. b1 b7 b12 a∗ .
. b2 b8 a∗ . .
. b3 a∗ . . .
. a∗ . . . .
. . . . . .
a∗ . . . . .
(a) Original proﬁle.
R1 R2 Q 3 Q 4 Q 5 Q 6
a4 a4 a4 a3 a2 a1
a3 a3 b4 b9 b13 a∗
a2 a2 b5 b10 a∗ b16
a1 a1 b6 a∗ b14 b17
. b1 a∗ b11 b15 .
. b2 b7 b12 . .
. b3 b8 . . .
. a∗ . . . .
. . . . . .
a∗ . . . . .
(b) Improvement of a∗ .
Fig. 2. The voting rule corresponding to the greedy algorithm is not score monotonic: an example.
We will ﬁrst prove that the solution x¯ is a feasible solution for R¯ . The deﬁnition of the x¯-variables clearly implies that
the second and third sets of constraints are satisﬁed (since the solution x is feasible). Also, the ﬁrst set of constraints is
trivially satisﬁed for each alternative a with def(a, R¯) = 0. Assume now that alternative a has def(a, R¯) > 0. Let eia be 1
if agent i ranks alternative a above a∗ in R and below it in R¯; otherwise let eia be 0. Then, it can be easily seen that
def(a, R) = def(a, R¯) +∑i∈N eia > 0. Hence, by the correspondence between the sets in S i(R¯) and the sets in S i,1(R), it
follows that for every set S ∈ S i(R¯) that contains alternative a, its corresponding set in S i,1(R) also contains a. Using this
observation and the deﬁnition of the solution x¯, we obtain that∑
i∈N
∑
S∈S i(R¯): a∈S
x¯S =
∑
i∈N
∑
S∈S i,1(R): a∈S
xS
=
∑
i∈N
( ∑
S∈S i(R): a∈S
xS −
∑
S∈S i,2(R): a∈S
xS
)
.
Let α =∑S∈S i,2(R): a∈S xS . Observe that if eia = 0, then no set S ∈ S i,2(R) contains a, thus α = 0. Otherwise, if eia = 1,
then the second constraint in the LP implies that α  1. In other words, in any case α is upper-bounded by eia . Using this
observation and, additionally, the fact that def(a, R) = def(a, R¯) +∑i∈N eia , we conclude that∑
i∈N
∑
S∈S i(R¯): a∈S
x¯S 
∑
i∈N
∑
S∈S i(R): a∈S
xS −
∑
i∈N
eia  def(a, R) −
∑
i∈N
eia = def(a, R¯),
as desired.
It is not hard to see that the objective of R¯ is upper bounded by the objective of R . Indeed, the coeﬃcient of each
x¯-variable in the objective of R¯ is at most equal to the coeﬃcient of the x-variable of the corresponding set in S i,1(R)
in R , i.e., the variable x¯Sik(R¯)
is multiplied by k in the objective of R¯ while the variable xSi
k+ri (R)−ri (R¯)(R)
is multiplied by
k + ri(R) − ri(R¯) k in R . 
In contrast, let us now consider the greedy algorithm. We design a preference proﬁle and a push of a∗ that demonstrate
that the algorithm is not score monotonic. Agents 1 through 6 vote according to the proﬁle RN given in Fig. 2(a). The
positions marked by “.” are placeholders for the rest of the alternatives, in some arbitrary order. Let A′ = {a1, . . . ,a4} and
A′′ = {b1, . . . ,b17}. Notice that def(a) = 1 for all a ∈ A′ and def(b) = 0 for all b ∈ A′′ . The optimal sequence of exchanges
moves a∗ all the way to the top of the preferences of agent 2, with a cost of seven. The greedy algorithm, given this
preference proﬁle, indeed chooses this sequence.
On the other hand, consider the proﬁle (R1, R2, Q 3, Q 4, Q 5, Q 6) given in Fig. 2(b) (where the position of a∗ was im-
proved by two positions in the preferences of agents 3 through 6). First notice that the deﬁcits have not changed compared
to the proﬁle RN . The greedy algorithm would in fact push a∗ to the top of the preferences of agents 6, 5, 4, and 3 (in this
order), with a total cost of ten. Note that the optimal solution still has a cost of seven. In conclusion, the greedy algorithm
is not score monotonic while the LP-based algorithm is score monotonic.
It should be mentioned that the following stronger notion of monotonicity is often considered in the literature: pushing
a winning alternative in the preferences of the agents cannot harm it, that is, cannot make it lose the election. We say
that a voting rule that satisﬁes this property is monotonic. Interestingly, Dodgson itself is not monotonic [6,19], a fact that
is considered by many to be a serious ﬂaw. However, this does not preclude the existence of an approximation algorithm
for the Dodgson score that is monotonic as a voting rule. Additionally, there are other prominent social choice properties
that are often considered, e.g., homogeneity: a voting rule is said to be homogeneous if duplicating the electorate does not
change the outcome of the election.
The existence of algorithms that approximate the Dodgson score well and also satisfy additional social choice properties
is addressed by Caragiannis et al. [7]. Among other results, Caragiannis et al. show that a monotonic approximation algo-
rithm for the Dodgson score cannot have an approximation ratio smaller than 2, and complement this result by designing
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a monotonic polynomial-time O(logm)-approximation algorithm. We nevertheless feel that our more preliminary discus-
sion of score monotonicity is worthwhile: in this setting approximation algorithms should also be compared by their social
choice properties.
With respect to our approximations, Caragiannis et al. provide the following results (see [7,43] for deﬁnitions of the
properties discussed below).
Theorem 4.2. (See [7].) Any homogeneous Dodgson approximation has approximation ratio at least Ω(m logm).
Theorem 4.3. (See [7].) Let V be a Dodgson approximation. If V satisﬁes combinativity or Smith consistency, then its approxima-
tion ratio is at least Ω(nm). If V satisﬁes mutual majority consistency, invariant loss consistency, or independence of closes, then its
approximation ratio is at least Ω(n).
As a corollary, we get the following result for our Dodgson approximations
Theorem 4.4. Neither the greedy Dodgson approximation nor the linear programming Dodgson approximation rule satisﬁes homo-
geneity, combinativity, Smith consistency, mutual majority consistency, invariant loss consistency, or independence of clones.
Caragiannis et al. [7] do propose a homogeneous Dodgson approximation (that is also monotonic), but its approximation
ratio of O(m logm) is inevitably worse than the ratio provided by the Dodgson approximations considered above.
5. Lower bounds for the Dodgson rule
McCabe-Dansted [30] gives a polynomial-time reduction from the Minimum Dominating Set problem to the Dodgson
score problem with the following property: given a graph G with k vertices, the reduction creates a preference proﬁle
with n = Θ(k) agents and m = Θ(k4) alternatives, such that the size of the minimum dominating set of G is k−2 scD(a∗)	,
where scD(a∗) is the Dodgson score of a distinguished alternative a∗ ∈ A. We observe that since the Minimum Dominating
Set problem is known to be NP-hard to approximate to within logarithmic factors [40], it follows that the Dodgson score
problem is also hard to approximate to a factor of Ω(logm). Due to the relation of Minimum Dominating Set to Minimum
Set Cover, using an inapproximability result due to Feige [17], the explicit inapproximability bound can become ( 14 − ) lnm
under the assumption that problems in NP do not have quasi-polynomial-time algorithms. This means that our algorithms
are asymptotically optimal.
5.1. Inapproximability of the Dodgson score
In the following, we present an alternative and more natural reduction directly from Minimum Set Cover that allows us
to obtain a better explicit inapproximability bound. This bound implies that our greedy algorithm is optimal up to a factor
of 2.
Theorem 5.1. There exists a β > 0 such that it isNP-hard to approximate the Dodgson score of a given alternative in an election with
m alternatives to within a factor of β lnm. Furthermore, for any  > 0, there is no polynomial-time ( 12 − ) lnm-approximation for the
Dodgson score of a given alternative unless all problems inNP have algorithms running in time kO(log logk) , where k is the input size.
Proof. We use a reduction from Minimum Set Cover (deﬁned formally below, when we present our reduction) and the
following well-known statements of its inapproximability.
Theorem 5.2. (See Raz and Safra [40].) There exists a constant α > 0 such that, given an instance (U ,S) of Minimum Set Cover with
|U | = n and an integer K  n, it isNP-hard to distinguish between the following two cases:
• (U ,S) has a cover of size at most K .
• Any cover of (U ,S) has size at least αK lnn.
Theorem 5.3. (See Feige [17].) For any constant  > 0, given an instance (U ,S) of Minimum Set Cover with |U | = n and an integer
K  n, there is no polynomial-time algorithm that distinguishes between the following two cases:
• (U ,S) has a cover of size at most K , and
• Any cover of (U ,S) has size at least (1− )K lnn,
unlessNP ⊆ DTIME(nO (log logn)).
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their relation to a generic NP-hard problem such as Satisﬁability (see [44], Chapter 29). For example, what Theorem 5.2
essentially states is that there exists a polynomial-time reduction which, on input an instance φ of Satisﬁability, constructs
an instance (U ,S) of Minimum Set Cover with the following properties: if φ is satisﬁable, (U ,S) has a cover of size at
most K , and if φ is not satisﬁable, any cover of (U ,S) has size at least αK lnn. This reduction implies that it is NP-hard to
approximate Minimum Set Cover within a factor of α lnn. The interpretation of the remaining inapproximability results that
are used or proved in the paper is similar.
Given an instance of Minimum Set Cover consisting of a set of n elements, a collection of sets over these elements and
an integer K  n, we construct a preference proﬁle with m = (1+ζ )n+αζ Kn lnn+1 alternatives and a speciﬁc alternative
a∗ in which we show that if we could distinguish in polynomial time between the following two cases:
• a∗ has Dodgson score at most (1+ ζ )Kn, and
• a∗ has Dodgson score at least αζ Kn lnn,
then we could have distinguished between the two cases of Theorems 5.2 and 5.3 for the original Minimum Set Cover
instance, contradicting the above inapproximability statements. Here, α is the inapproximability constant in Theorem 5.2
or 5.3 (in the latter α = 1 − ), and ζ is an arbitrarily large positive constant. In this way, we obtain an inapproximability
bound of αζ1+ζ lnn. Since m = (1+ ζ )n+αζ Kn lnn+ 1, it holds that lnn 12 lnm−O(ln lnm), and hence the inapproxima-
bility bound for Dodgson score can be expressed in terms of the number of alternatives m as stated in Theorem 5.1.
We now present our reduction. Given an instance (U ,S) of Minimum Set Cover consisting of a set U of n elements,
a collection S of sets S1, S2, . . . , S |S| and an integer K  n, we construct the following preference proﬁle. There are the
following alternatives:
• A set of n basic alternatives, each corresponding to an element of U . Abusing notation, we also call this set U .
• A set Z of ζn alternatives where ζ is a positive constant.
• A set F of αζ Kn lnn alternatives, where α is the constant from Theorem 5.2.
• A speciﬁc alternative a∗ .
There are the following 2|S| + 1 agents:
• A critical agent 
i for each set Si ∈ S .
• An indifferent agent ri for each set Si ∈ S .
• A special agent v∗ .
The preferences of the agents are deﬁned as follows:
• The special agent v∗ ranks a∗ in the ﬁrst position of its preferences and the rest of the alternatives occupy the remaining
positions in arbitrary order (i.e., a∗Rv∗ (U ∪ Z ∪ F )).
• The critical agent 
i ranks the basic alternatives corresponding to the elements of Si in the ﬁrst positions of its prefer-
ence (in arbitrary order), next the alternatives of Z , next a∗ , next the alternatives of F , and, in the last positions of its
preference, the basic alternatives corresponding to the elements in U\Si (i.e., Si R
i Z R
i a∗R
i F R
i (U\Si)).
• We construct the ranking of the indifferent agents as follows. Initialize S ′1, S ′2, . . . , S ′|S| as S ′1 ← S1, S ′2 ← S2, . . . , S ′|S| ←
S |S| . For each element u of U , choose arbitrarily j ∈ {1,2, . . . , |S|} such that u ∈ S ′j and set S ′j ← S ′j \ {u}. Denote by
S ′ the collection S ′1, S ′2, . . . , S ′|S| resulting after each u ∈ U has been processed in this way. The indifferent agent ri
ranks the basic alternatives corresponding to the elements in U \ S ′i in the ﬁrst positions of its preference, followed
the alternatives of F , then a∗ , then the alternatives of Z , and then in the last positions of its preference the basic
alternatives corresponding to elements in S ′i (if any)—i.e., (U \ S ′i)Rr
i
F Rr
i
a∗Rri Z Rri S ′i .
Clearly, a∗ is preferred to any alternative in Z by the special agent and by the |S| indifferent agents, i.e., by a majority
of agents. Similarly, a∗ is preferred to any alternative in F by the special agent and by the |S| critical agents. Now, for each
element of U , denote by fu the number of sets in S that contain u. Then, a∗ is preferred to u by the special agent, by the
|S| − fu critical agents corresponding to sets in S that do not contain u, and by the fu − 1 indifferent agents corresponding
to sets in S ′ that contain u (i.e., by |S| agents in total). Hence, a∗ has a deﬁcit of exactly 1 with respect to each of the
alternatives in U .
Theorem 5.1 follows by the next two lemmas that give bounds on the Dodgson score of alternative a∗ in the two cases
of interest: when (U ,S) has a cover of size at most K (Lemma 5.4) and when any cover of (U ,S) has size at least αK lnn
(Lemma 5.5).
Lemma 5.4. If (U ,S) has a cover of size K , then a∗ has Dodgson score at most (1+ ζ )Kn.
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pushing a∗ to the ﬁrst position in the preference of the critical agent 
i such that Si ∈ H , a∗ will decrease its deﬁcit with
respect to each of the basic alternatives by 1, and hence it will become a Condorcet winner. The total number of positions
a∗ rises is at most |H| · (|Z | + n) = (1+ ζ )nK . 
Lemma 5.5. If every cover of (U ,S) has size at least αK lnn, then a∗ has Dodgson score at least αζ Kn lnn.
Proof. We ﬁrst assume that the minimum number of positions a∗ has to rise in order to beat the basic alternatives and
become a Condorcet winner includes raising a∗ by at least |F | positions in the ranking of some indifferent agent ri . Hence,
a∗ rises |F | positions in the preference of ri in order to reach position |U\S ′i |+1 and at least n additional positions in order
to beat the basic alternatives. Its Dodgson score is thus at least |F | + n αζ Kn lnn.
Now, assume that the minimum number of positions a∗ has to rise in order to beat the basic alternatives does not
include raising a∗ by at least |F | positions in the ranking of some indifferent agent. We will show that if the Dodgson score
of a∗ is less than αζ Kn lnn, then there exists a cover of (U ,S) of size less than αK lnn, contradicting the assumption of
the lemma.
Let H be the set of critical agents in whose preferences a∗ is pushed at least |Z | positions higher. Over all the preference
lists of all the agents in H , a∗ rises a total of |H| · |Z | positions in order to reach position |Si | + 1 in each list, plus at least n
additional positions in order to decrease by 1 its deﬁcit with respect to each of the alternatives in U . So, recalling |Z | = ζn,
a∗ rises at least ζ |H|n + n positions. Denoting the Dodgson score of a∗ by scD(a∗), we thus have |H|  1ζn scD(a∗) − 1ζ <
αK lnn. The proof is completed by observing that the union of the sets Si for each critical agent 
i belonging to H contains
all the basic alternatives, i.e., H corresponds to a cover for (U ,S) of size less than αK lnn. 
This completes the proof of Theorem 5.1. 
5.2. Inapproximability of Dodgson rankings
A question related to the approximability of Dodgson scores is the approximability of the Dodgson ranking, that is, the
ranking of alternatives given by ordering them by nondecreasing Dodgson score. To the best of our knowledge, no rank
aggregation function, which maps preference proﬁles to rankings of the alternatives, is known to provably produce rankings
that are close to the Dodgson ranking [38,39,27–29] (see the survey of related work in Section 1).
Our next result establishes that eﬃcient approximation algorithms for Dodgson ranking are unlikely to exist unless
P = NP . It does so by proving that the problem of distinguishing between whether a given alternative is the unique
Dodgson winner or in the last O (
√
m) positions is NP-hard. This result provides a complexity-theoretic explanation for
the sharp discrepancies observed in the Social Choice Theory literature when comparing Dodgson elections with simpler,
eﬃciently computable, voting rules.
Theorem 5.6. Given a preference proﬁle with m alternatives and an alternative a∗ , it is NP-hard to decide whether a∗ is a Dodgson
winner or has rank at least m − 6√m in any Dodgson ranking.
Proof. We use a reduction from Minimum Vertex Cover in 3-regular graphs, and exploit a result concerning its inapprox-
imability that follows from the work of Berman and Karpinski [3]. Our approach is similar to the proof of Theorem 5.1,
albeit considerably more involved. We use the following result.
Theorem 5.7. (See Berman and Karpinski [3], see also [25].) Given a 3-regular graph G with n = 22t nodes for some integer t > 0 and
an integer K in [n/2,n − 6], it isNP-hard to distinguish between the following two cases:
• G has a vertex cover of size at most K .
• Any vertex cover of G has size at least K + 6.
Given an instance of Minimum Vertex Cover consisting of a 3-regular graph G with n = 22t nodes v0, v1, . . . , vn−1 and
an integer K ∈ [n/2,n− 6], we construct in polynomial time a preference proﬁle in which if we could distinguish whether a
particular alternative is a Dodgson winner or not very far from the last position in any Dodgson ranking, then we could also
distinguish between the two cases mentioned in Theorem 5.7 for the original Minimum Vertex Cover instance. See page 46
for an example of the construction. The Dodgson election has the following sets of alternatives:
• A special alternative a∗ .
• A set F of 4Kn/11+ 3n/2 alternatives. These alternatives are partitioned into n disjoint blocks F0, F1, . . . , Fn−1 so that
each block contains either 4K/11+ 3/2 or 4K/11+ 3/2	 alternatives.
• A set A of n alternatives a0,a1, . . . ,an−1.
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three alternatives of U that correspond to the edges of G which are incident to node vi .
For each node vi of G , there are two agents: one left agent 
i and one right agent ri . The preferences of the left agent

i are as follows:
• The three alternatives of Si are ranked by agent 
i in the ﬁrst three positions of its preference (in arbitrary order).
• From position 4 to position 4n/11+ 3, agent 
i ranks the alternatives ai,a(i+1) mod n, . . . ,a(i+4n/11−1) mod n in this order.
• In position 4n/11+ 4, agent 
i ranks a∗ .
• From position 4n/11 + 5 to position 4Kn/11 + 41n/22 + 4, agent 
i ranks the alternatives of F in the following order.
The alternatives of Fi are ranked in positions from 4n/11 + 5 to 4n/11 + 4 + |Fi | (in arbitrary order). Next, agent 
i
ranks the alternatives of sets F0, . . . , Fi−1, Fi+1, . . . , Fn−1 in this order (the relative order of the alternatives of the same
block is arbitrary).
• From position 4Kn/11 + 41n/22 + 5 to position 4Kn/11 + 5n/2 + 4, agent 
i ranks the alternatives a(i+4n/11) mod n,
a(i+4n/11+1) mod n, . . . ,a(i−1) mod n in this order.
• In the last 3n/2− 3 positions, agent 
i ranks the alternatives of U \ Si (in arbitrary order).
The preferences of the right agent ri are as follows:
• In the ﬁrst 3n/2 − 3 positions, agent ri ranks the alternatives of U \ Si in reverse relative order to the order 
i ranks
them.
• From position 3n/2− 2 to position 4Kn/11+ 3n− |Fi | − 3, agent ri ranks the alternatives of the blocks Fn−1, Fn−2, . . . ,
Fi+1, Fi−1, . . . , F0 in this order so that the alternatives of block F j are ranked in reverse relative order to the order 
i
ranks them.
• From position 4Kn/11 + 3n − |Fi | − 2 to position 4Kn/11 + 40n/11 − |Fi | − 5, agent ri ranks the alternatives
a(n−i−1) mod n,a(n−i−2) mod n, . . . ,a(4n/11−i+2) mod n in this order.
• In position 4Kn/11+ 40n/11− |Fi | − 4, agent ri ranks a∗ .
• From position 4Kn/11 + 40n/11 − |Fi | − 3 to position 4Kn/11 + 40n/11 − 4, agent ri ranks the alternatives of Fi in
reverse relative order to the order 
i ranks them.
• From position 4Kn/11 + 40n/11 − 3 to position 4Kn/11 + 4n − 2, agent ri ranks the alternatives a(4n/11−i+1) mod n,
a(4n/11−i) mod n, . . . ,a(n−i) mod n in this order.
• The three alternatives of Si are ranked in the last three positions in the preference of agent ri , in reverse relative order
to the order 
i ranks them.
We observe that a∗ beats all alternatives but the alternatives of U . In particular, a∗ is preferred to each alternative of F
by n+1 agents. Speciﬁcally, a∗ is ranked above an alternative belonging to the block Fi by the n left agents and by the right
agent ri . Also, the alternative ai is ranked below a∗ by the 7n/11 left agents 
(i+1) mod n, 
(i+2) mod n, . . . , 
(i+7n/11−1) mod n
and by the 4n/11 + 2 right agents r(i+7n/11−1) mod n, r(i+7n/11) mod n, . . . , ri . Hence, a∗ beats all alternatives in set A as well
since it is ranked above each of them by n+ 2 agents. Also, a∗ is ranked above the alternative u j corresponding to the edge
e j of G by the left agents 
i and 
i
′
and by all right agents besides ri and ri
′
so that nodes vi and vi′ are the endpoints of
edge e j in G . Hence, a∗ has a deﬁcit of 1 with respect to each of the alternatives in U .
We also observe that the alternatives in F beat each alternative in A. Note that each agent other than ri who prefers a∗
to an alternative in A also prefers an alternative in block Fi to the alternative in A. Hence, each alternative of F beats each
alternative of A since it is ranked above it by n+1 agents. Furthermore, similarly to a∗ , each alternative in F is preferred to
each alternative of U by n agents. Also, when an alternative f of F is ranked above another alternative f ′ of F by agent 
i ,
f ′ is ranked above f by agent ri . Hence, an alternative of F has a deﬁcit of 1 with respect to U and each other alternative
in F , and a deﬁcit of 2 with respect to a∗ .
Furthermore, observe that each alternative in A is ranked above the alternative u j corresponding to the edge e j of G by
the left agents 
i and 
i
′
and by all right agents besides ri and ri
′
so that nodes vi and vi′ are the endpoints of edge e j in
G , i.e., by n agents. Also, when an alternative a of A is preferred to another alternative a′ of A by agent 
i , a′ is preferred
to a by agent ri . Hence, an alternative in A has a deﬁcit of 1 with respect to each alternative in U and each remaining
alternative in A, a deﬁcit of 2 with respect to each alternative in F , and a deﬁcit of 3 with respect to a∗ . This immediately
yields that the Dodgson score of each alternative in A is at least 8Kn/11+ 11n/2+ 2.
Similarly, when an alternative u of U is preferred to another alternative u′ of U by agent 
i , u′ is preferred to u by
agent ri . Hence, an alternative in U has a deﬁcit of 1 with respect to each of the alternatives in A and F , each other
alternative in U , and a∗ . This immediately yields that the Dodgson score of each alternative in U is at least 4Kn/11 + 4n.
A summary of the deﬁcit of each alternative with respect to any other alternative is presented in Table 1.
The next lemma gives upper and lower bounds on the Dodgson score of the alternatives in F .
Lemma 5.8. Each alternative in F has Dodgson score between 4Kn/11+ 3n + 1 and 4Kn/11+ 37n/11+ 2K/11+ 3/4.
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The deﬁcit of each alternative (rows) against any other alternative (columns).
a∗ Any alt. in F Any alt. in A Any alt. in U
a∗ – 0 0 1
Any alt. in F 2 1 0 1
Any alt. in A 3 2 1 1
Any alt. in U 1 1 1 1
Proof. Since each alternative in F has a deﬁcit of 1 with respect to each alternative in U and each other alternative in F ,
and a deﬁcit of 2 with respect to a∗ , its Dodgson score is at least |U | + |F | − 1+ 2 = 4Kn/11+ 3n + 1.
Now, consider an alternative f belonging to block Fi . f is at distance at most⌊ |Fi| − 1
2
+ 1
⌋
 |Fi| + 1
2
 4K/11+ 3/2 + 1
2
 2K/11+ 7/4
from a∗ in the preferences of either the left agent 
i or the right agent ri . Hence, by raising f at most 2K/11+7/4 positions
in the preferences of either 
i or ri , its deﬁcit with respect to a∗ decreases by 1. Consider a left agent 
i′ with i′ = i and
let F ′ be the subset of alternatives in F that are higher than f in the preferences of 
i′ . By pushing f to the ﬁrst position
in the preferences of agent 
i
′
(i.e., 4n/11 + 3 + |F ′| positions in addition to the 2K/11 + 7/4 positions mentioned above),
f decreases its deﬁcit by 1 with respect to each alternative of F ′ and a∗ , as well as with respect to the three alternatives of
Si′ in the ﬁrst three positions in the preferences of 
i
′
. Now, consider the right agent ri
′
. In the preferences of ri
′
, f is ranked
higher than the alternatives in F ′ and lower than the alternatives in F\F ′ − { f }. Hence, by pushing f to the ﬁrst position
in the preferences of agent ri
′
(i.e., |F\F ′ − { f }| + 3n/2 − 3 = 4Kn/11 − |F ′| + 3n − 4 additional positions), f decreases its
deﬁcit by 1 with respect to each alternative of F\F ′ − { f } as well the alternatives of U\Si′ in the ﬁrst 3n/2− 3 positions in
the preferences of ri . Hence, by pushing 4Kn/11+ 37n/11+ 2K/11+ 3/4 positions, f becomes a Condorcet winner. 
The next two lemmas give bounds on the Dodgson score of alternative a∗ in the two cases of interest: when G has a
vertex cover of size at most K (Lemma 5.9), and when any vertex cover of G has size at least K + 6 (Lemma 5.10).
Lemma 5.9. If G has a vertex cover of size at most K , then the Dodgson score of a∗ is less than 4Kn/11+ 3n.
Proof. Let H ⊆ V be a vertex cover of G with |H| = K . By the deﬁnition of the vertex cover, H covers all edges of G and
this implies that
⋃
i:vi∈H Si = U . Hence, by pushing a∗ to the ﬁrst position in the preferences of each of the K left agents 
i
such that vi ∈ H , a∗ decreases it deﬁcit with respect to each of the alternatives in U by 1, and becomes a Condorcet winner.
The total number of positions a∗ rises is K (4n/11+ 3) < 4Kn/11+ 3n. The last inequality is true since K < n. 
Lemma 5.10. If any vertex cover of G has size at least K +6, then the Dodgson score of a∗ is larger than 4Kn/11+37n/11+2K/11+
3/4.
Proof. First assume that the minimum sequence of exchanges that makes a∗ beat the alternatives of U and become a
Condorcet winner includes pushing a∗ to one of the ﬁrst 3n/2 − 3 positions in the preferences of some right agent ri .
Certainly, not all alternatives of U are beaten in this way since the three alternatives of Si are ranked below a∗ by agent ri .
So, in order to beat the remaining 3 alternatives of Si , a∗ has to either be pushed to one of the ﬁrst three positions of a
left agent or to one of the ﬁrst 3n/2 − 3 positions of another right agent ri′ with i′ = i. Hence, a∗ must be ﬁrst pushed to
position 3n/2− 2 of agent ri (i.e., |F\Fi | + 7n/11− 2 positions), to position 4 of a left agent (4n/11 additional positions) or
to position 3n/2 − 2 of agent ri′ (|F\Fi′ | + 7n/11 − 2 additional positions), and then rise at least 3n/2 additional positions
in order to beat all alternatives of U . In total, a∗ rises at least
|F\Fi| + 7n/11− 2+min
{
4n/11, |F\Fi′ | + 7n/11− 2
}+ 3n/2
 |F | − |Fi| + 5n/2− 2
 4Kn/11+ 4n − 4K/11+ 3/2 − 2
 4Kn/11+ 4n − 4K/11− 9/2
= 4Kn/11+ 37n/11+ n/11+ 6n/11− 4K/11− 9/2
 4Kn/11+ 37n/11+ 22/11+ 6(K + 6)/11− 4K/11− 9/2
> 4Kn/11+ 37n/11+ 2K/11+ 3/4
positions. The fourth inequality holds since n 22 and n K + 6.
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Fig. 3. A 3-regular graph with 22 nodes.
Now, assume that the minimum sequence of exchanges for making a∗ a Condorcet winner does not include raising a∗
to any of the ﬁrst 3n/2 − 3 positions of any right agent. We will show that if a∗ has Dodgson score at most 4Kn/11 +
37n/11+ 2K/11+ 3/4, then G has a vertex cover of size less than K + 6, contradicting the assumption of the lemma.
Let H be the set of left agents where a∗ rises to one of the ﬁrst three positions in order to beat all the alternatives
of U . In total, a∗ rises 4|H|n/11 positions in order to reach position 4 in the preferences of each of the agents in H
plus at least 3n/2 additional positions in order to decrease its deﬁcit with respect to the alternatives in U by at least 1,
i.e., at least 4|H|n/11 + 3n/2 positions in total. Hence, by denoting the Dodgson score of a∗ by scD(a∗), we have |H| 
11
4n (scD(a
∗) − 3n/2).
Since
⋃
i:
i∈H Si = U , the set of nodes of G consisting of nodes vi such that agent 
i belongs to H is a vertex cover of G
of size |H|. Assuming that the Dodgson score of a∗ is at most 4Kn/11+ 37n/11+ 2K/11+ 3/4, we have
|H| 11
4n
(
scD
(
a∗
)− 3n/2)
 11
4n
(4Kn/11+ 41n/22+ 2K/11+ 3/4)
< K + 6,
where the last inequality follows since K  n − 6. 
By Lemmas 5.8, 5.9, and 5.10, we obtain that if G has a vertex cover of size at most K , then a∗ is the unique Dodgson
winner, while if every vertex cover of G has size at least K + 6, then a∗ is below all alternatives in F in any Dodgson
ranking. Denote by m the total number of alternatives and recall that m = |F | + |A| + |U | + 1 = 4Kn/11+ 4n + 1. Then, the
rank of a∗ in the second case is at least
|F | + 1 = 4Kn/11+ 3n/2+ 1 =m − 5n/2 =m −
√
25n2/4
m −√25nK/2m − 6√4Kn/11+ 4n + 1 =m − 6√m,
where the ﬁrst inequality follows since K  n/2. By Theorem 5.7, we obtain the desired result. 
An example. We present an example of the construction in the proof of Theorem 5.6. Consider an instance of Minimum
Vertex Cover with the 22-node 3-regular graph of Fig. 3, and K = 12.
The corresponding preference proﬁle has 185 alternatives and 44 agents. In particular, the set F has 129 alternatives
f0, f1, . . . , f128, which are partitioned into 22 blocks as follows. Block F0 contains the six alternatives f0, f1, . . . , f5, block
F1 contains the six alternatives f6, . . . , f11, . . . , block F18 contains the six alternatives f108, . . . , f113, block F19 contains
the ﬁve alternatives f114, . . . , f118, . . . , and block F21 contains the alternatives f124, . . . , f128. The set A has 22 alternatives
a0, . . . ,a21. The set U has 33 alternatives u0, . . . ,u32, one alternative for each edge of the graph. The agents are partitioned
into 22 left agents and 22 right agents. In order to compute the preferences of an agent, say agent 
17, we ﬁrst compute
the set S17, which contains the alternatives corresponding to the edges incident to node v17 of the graph, i.e., S17 =
{u24,u27,u28}. Now, the preferences of agent 
17 are:
S17R

17a17R

17a18R

17 · · · R
17a1R
17a2R
17a∗R
17 F17R
17 F0R
17 · · · F16
R

17
F18R

17 · · · R
17 F21R
17a3R
17 · · · R
17a16R
17(U \ S17).
Similarly, the preferences of agent r17 are:
I. Caragiannis et al. / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 187–188 (2012) 31–51 47(
←
U \ S17)R
17
←
F21 R

17
←
F20 R

17 · · · R
17 ←F18 R
17
←
F16 R

17 · · · R
17 ←F0 R
17
a4R

17a3R

17 · · · R
17a15R
17a∗R
17
←
F17 a16R

17a5R

17
←
S17,
where the symbol ← on top of a set of alternatives is used to denote that their order in the preferences of r17 is the reverse
of the order 
17 ranks them.
6. Inapproximability of Young scores and rankings
Recall that the Young score of a given alternative a∗ ∈ A is the size of the largest subset of agents for which a∗ is a
Condorcet winner.
It is straightforward to obtain a simple ILP for the Young score problem. As before, let a∗ ∈ A be the alternative whose
Young score we wish to compute. Let the variables of the program be xi ∈ {0,1} for all i ∈ N; xi = 1 if and only if agent i
is included in the subset of agents for a∗ . Deﬁne constants eia ∈ {−1,1} for all i ∈ N and a ∈ A \ {a∗}, which depend on the
given preference proﬁle; eia = 1 if and only if agent i ranks a∗ higher than a. The ILP that computes the Young score of a∗
is given by:
maximize
∑
i∈N
xi
subject to ∀a ∈ A \ {a∗}, ∑
i∈N
xieia  1
∀i ∈ N, xi ∈ {0,1}. (4)
The ILP (4) for the Young score is seemingly simpler than the one for the Dodgson score. This might seem to indicate
that the problem can be easily approximated by similar techniques. Therefore, the following result is quite surprising.
Theorem 6.1. It isNP-hard to approximate the Young score by any factor.
Proof. This result becomes more self-evident when we notice that the Young score has the rare property of being non-
monotonic as an optimization problem, in the following sense: given a subset of agents that make a∗ a Condorcet winner,
it is not necessarily the case that a smaller subset of the agents would satisfy the same property. This stands in contrast
to many approximable optimization problems, in which a solution that is worse than an optimal solution is also a valid
solution. Consider the Set Cover problem, for instance: if one adds more subsets to a valid cover, one obtains a valid cover.
The same goes for the Dodgson score problem: if a sequence of exchanges makes a∗ a Condorcet winner, introducing more
exchanges on top of the existing ones would not undo this fact.
In order to prove the inapproximability of the Young score, we deﬁne the following problem.
Nonempty Subset
Instance: An alternative a∗ , and a preference proﬁle RN ∈ LN .
Question: Is there a nonempty subset of agents C ⊆ N , C = ∅, for which a∗ is a Condorcet winner?
To prove Theorem 6.1, it is suﬃcient to prove that Nonempty Subset is NP-hard. Indeed, this implies that it is NP-hard
to distinguish whether the Young score of a given alternative is zero or greater than zero, which directly entails that the
score cannot be approximated.
Lemma 6.2. Nonempty Subset isNP-complete.
Proof. The problem is clearly in NP ; a witness is given by a nonempty set of agents for which a∗ is a Condorcet winner.
In order to show NP-hardness, we present a polynomial-time reduction from the NP-hard Exact Cover by 3-Sets (X3C)
problem [20] to our problem. An instance of the X3C problem includes a ﬁnite set of elements U , |U | = n (where n is
divisible by 3), and a collection S of 3-element subsets of U , S = {S1, . . . , Sk}, such that for every i, 1 i  k, Si ⊆ U and
|Si | = 3. The question is whether the collection S contains an exact cover for U , i.e., a subcollection S∗ ⊆ S of size n/3 such
that every element of U occurs in exactly one subset in S .
We next give the details of the reduction from X3C to Nonempty Subset. Given an instance of X3C, deﬁned by the set U
and a collection of 3-element sets S , we construct the following instance of Nonempty Subset.
Deﬁne the set of alternatives as A = U ∪ {a} ∪ {a∗}. Let the set of agents be N = N ′ ∪ N ′′ , where N ′ and N ′′ are deﬁned
as follows. The set N ′ is composed of k agents, corresponding to the k subsets in S , such that for all i ∈ N ′ , agent i prefers
the alternatives in U \ Si to a∗ , and prefers a∗ to all the alternatives in Si ∪ {a} (i.e., (U \ Si) Ri a∗Ri (Si ∪ {a})). Subset N ′′
is composed of n − 1 agents who prefer a to a∗ and a∗ to U (i.e., for all i ∈ N ′′ , aRia∗RiU ).3
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which a∗ is a Condorcet winner in the constructed instance.
Suﬃciency: Let S∗ be an exact cover by 3-sets of U , and let N∗ ⊆ N ′ be the subset of agents corresponding to the n3
subsets Si ∈ S∗ . We show that a∗ is a Condorcet winner for C = N∗ ∪ N ′′ . Since S∗ is an exact cover, for all b ∈ U there
exists exactly one agent in N∗ that prefers a∗ to b and n3 − 1 agents in N∗ that prefer b to a∗ . In addition, all n3 − 1 agents
in N ′′ prefer a∗ to b. Therefore, a∗ beats b in a pairwise election.
It remains to show that a∗ beats a in a pairwise election. This is true since all n3 agents in N
∗ prefer a∗ to a, and there
are only n3 − 1 agents in N ′′ who prefer a to a∗ . It follows that a∗ is a Condorcet winner for N∗ ∪ N ′′ .
Necessity: Assume the given instance of X3C has no exact cover. We have to show that there is no subset of agents for
which a∗ is a Condorcet winner. Let C ⊆ N , C = ∅, and let N∗ = C ∩ N ′ . We distinguish among three cases.
Case 1: |N∗| = 0. It must hold that C ∩ N ′′ = ∅. In this case, a∗ loses to a in a pairwise election, since all the agents in N ′′
prefer a to a∗ .
Case 2: 0 < |N∗|  n3 . Since there is no exact cover, the corresponding sets Si cannot cover U . Thus there exists b ∈ U
that is ranked higher than a∗ by all agents in N∗ . In order for a∗ to beat b in a pairwise election, C must include at least
|N∗| + 1 agents from N ′′ . However, this means that a beats a∗ in a pairwise election (since a is ranked lower than a∗ by
|N∗| agents, and higher than a∗ by at least |N∗| + 1 agents). It follows that a∗ is not a Condorcet winner for C .
Case 3: |N∗| > n3 . Let us award each alternative b ∈ A \ {a∗} a point for each agent that ranks it above a∗ , and subtract a
point for each agent that ranks it below a∗ . a∗ is a Condorcet winner if and only if the score of every b ∈ A \ {a∗}, counted
this way, is negative. This implies that a∗ is a Condorcet winner only if for every subset B ⊆ A of alternatives, the total
score of the alternatives in B is at most −|B|.
We shall calculate the total score of the alternatives in U from the agents in N∗ . Every agent in N∗ prefers a∗ to 3
alternatives in U and prefers n − 3 alternatives in U to a∗ . Thus, every agent in N∗ contributes (n − 3) − 3 = n − 6 points
to the total score of U . Summing over all the agents in N∗ , we have that the total score of U from N∗ is |N∗|(n − 6). By
|N∗| > n3 , we have that
|N∗|(n − 6)
((
n
3
− 1
)
+ 2
)
(n − 6) =
(
n
3
− 1
)
n − 6.
Recall that every agent in N ′′ prefers a∗ to all alternatives in U . However, since |N ′′| = n3 − 1, agents from N ′′ can only
subtract ( n3 − 1)n from the total score of U . We conclude that the total score of U is at least −6. Since we can assume that
|U | = n > 6,3 a∗ cannot beat all the alternatives in U in pairwise elections. 
This concludes the proof of Theorem 6.1. 
A short discussion is in order. Theorem 6.1 states that the Young score cannot be eﬃciently approximated to any factor.
The proof shows that, in fact, unless P =NP it is impossible to eﬃciently distinguish between a zero and a nonzero score.
However, the proof actually shows more: it constructs a family of instances, where it is hard to distinguish between a score
of zero and almost 2m/3. Now, if one looks at an alternative formulation of the Young score problem where all the scores
are scaled by an additive constant, it is no longer true that it is hard to approximate the score to any factor; however, the
proof still shows that it is hard to approximate the Young score, even under this alternative formulation, to a factor of O(m).
The strong inapproximability result for the Young score intuitively implies that the Young ranking cannot be approxi-
mated. The following corollary, whose proof is a straightforward variation on the proof of Lemma 6.2, shows that this is
indeed the case. It can be viewed as an analog of Theorem 5.6 for Young.
Corollary 6.3. For any constant  > 0, given a preference proﬁle with m alternatives and an alternative a∗ , it is NP-hard to decide
whether a∗ has rankO(m) or is ranked in place m (that is, ranked last) in any Young ranking.
Proof. Let  > 0 be a constant. We perform the same reduction as before, with the following differences. Let A′ be the set
of alternatives constructed in the reduction of Lemma 6.2, and m′ = |A′|; we add a set B of (m′)1/ additional alternatives,
i.e., A = A′ ∪ B , m = |A| =m′ + (m′)1/ . The set of agents is N ′ ∪ N ′′ ∪ N∗ , the preferences of N ′ and N ′′ restricted to A′ are
as before, and all these agents rank B at the bottom. All the agents in N∗ rank a∗ last; for each b ∈ A′ \ {a∗}, there is i ∈ N∗
that ranks b ﬁrst and B just above a∗ , i.e.,
bRi
(
A′ \ {a∗,b})Ri BRia∗.
For each c ∈ B , there is i ∈ N∗ that ranks c ﬁrst and the rest of B just above a∗ , namely
cRi
(
A′ \ {a∗})Ri(B \ {c})Ria∗.
3 X3C is obviously tractable for a constant n, as one can examine all the families S ′ ⊆S of constant size in polynomial time.
I. Caragiannis et al. / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 187–188 (2012) 31–51 49Notice that the Young score of the alternatives in A′ \ {a∗} is at least one. The Young score of any alternative c ∈ B is
exactly one, since exactly one agent (in N∗) does not rank A′ \ {a∗} above c. Now, if there is an exact 3-cover, then the
Young score of a∗ is at least 2n/3− 1 (according to the proof of Lemma 6.2), so a∗ is ranked above all the alternatives in B ,
that is, in the top m′ + 1 = O(m) places. On the other hand, if there is no exact 3-cover, then the Young score of a∗ is
zero by the same arguments as in Lemma 6.2, since the agents in N∗ all rank a∗ last. Hence a∗ is placed last in any Young
ranking. 
As noted in Section 2, one can imagine another alternative formulation of the Young score. Indeed, one might ask: given
a preference proﬁle, what is the smallest number of agents that must be removed in order to make a∗ a Condorcet winner?
This minimization problem, where the score is the number of agents that are removed, is referred to as the Dual Young score
by Betzler et al. [4]. Of course, a Young winner according to the primal formulation is always a winner according to the dual
formulation, and vice versa. Notice that it is easy to obtain an n-approximation under the dual formulation for any constant
 > 0 by enumerating all subsets of agents of size at least n− 1/ and checking whether a∗ is the Condorcet winner in the
preferences of these agents. Our next result states that the dual Young score is hard to approximate signiﬁcantly better.
Theorem 6.4. For any constant  > 0, the dual Young score isNP-hard to approximate within O (n1−).
Proof. We rely on a statement regarding the inapproximability of Vertex Cover that is weaker than Theorem 5.7; the one
we used in the proof for the inapproximability of the Dodgson ranking.
Theorem 6.5. (See Berman and Karpinski [3], see also [25].) Given a 3-regular graph G and an integer K  1, it is NP-hard to
distinguish between the following two cases:
• G has a vertex cover of size at most K .
• Any vertex cover of G has size at least K + 2.
Our reduction extends the one in the proof of Lemma 6.2. Consider a 3-regular graph G = (V1, E) with p nodes and an
integer K  1. Also, let  ∈ (0,1) be a constant and let n = p1/. Denote by H = (V2, F ) the complete graph with n − p
nodes.
Deﬁne the set of alternatives as A = E ∪ F ∪ {a} ∪ {a∗}. Let the set of agents be N = N ′ ∪ N ′′ ∪ N ′′′ , where N ′ , N ′′ , and
N ′′′ are deﬁned as follows. The set N ′ consists of p agents corresponding to the p nodes of G , such that for all i ∈ N ′ ,
agent i prefers the alternatives in F ∪ E \ Ei to a∗ (where the set Ei consists of the edges of E which are incident to
node i), and prefers a∗ to all the alternatives in Ei ∪ {a} (i.e., ((F ∪ E) \ Ei)Ria∗Ri(Ei ∪ {a})). The set N ′′ contains n − p
agents corresponding to the n − p nodes of H , such that for all i ∈ N ′′ , agent i prefers the alternatives in E ∪ F \ Fi to a∗
(where the set Fi consists of the edges of F which are incident to node i), and prefers a∗ to all the alternatives in Fi ∪ {a}
(i.e., ((E ∪ F ) \ Fi)Ria∗Ri(Fi ∪ {a})). Subset N ′′′ consists of n − p + K − 2 agents who prefer a to a∗ and a∗ to E ∪ F (i.e.,
aRia∗Ri(E ∪ F )).
Theorem 6.4 now follows by Theorem 6.5 and the next two lemmas.
Lemma 6.6. If G has a vertex cover of size at most K , then the dual Young score of alternative a∗ is at most n .
Proof. Let C ⊆ V1 be a vertex cover of G of size at most K . Consider the following sets of agents: a set N∗ ⊆ N ′ that
contains the agents that correspond to nodes in the vertex cover C , a set N+ of all the agents of N ′′ besides one, and the
set N ′′′ .
Recall that N∗ ∪ N+ has size at most n − p + K − 1 while N ′′′ has size n − p + K − 2. Since C is a vertex cover in G ,
each alternative in E is ranked lower than a∗ by at least one agent of N∗ . Also, the nodes corresponding to the agents in
N+ form a vertex cover of H . So, each alternative in F is ranked lower than a∗ by at least one agent of N+ . Hence, by
considering the agents of N∗ ∪ N+ ∪ N ′′′ , a∗ beats any other alternative in their pairwise comparison and its dual Young
score is at most p − |C | + 1 p  n . 
Lemma 6.7. If G has no vertex cover of size less than K + 2, then the dual Young score of alternative a∗ is n.
Proof. We will show that there is no nonempty subset of agents that make a∗ a Condorcet winner. Indeed, assume for
contradiction that there exists such a subset that contains the sets of agents N∗ ⊆ N ′ , N+ ⊆ N ′′ , and N− ⊆ N ′′′ .
If |N+| < n − p − 1 or |N∗| < K + 2 then there exists an alternative of E or F which is not ranked lower than a∗ by any
agent of N∗ ∪ N+ . In both cases, N− must have size at least |N∗|+ |N+| in order for a∗ to beat every alternative in E ∪ F in
their pairwise comparison. However, a∗ does not beat a and cannot be a Condorcet winner.
Therefore, it holds that |N+| ∈ {n − p − 1,n − p} and |N∗|  K + 2. If |N+| = n − p − 1, then some alternative of F is
ranked below a∗ by at most one agent of N+ . It is also ranked above a∗ by the agents of N∗ and below it by the agents
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agents. Hence, a∗ cannot be a Condorcet winner in this case.
If |N+| = n − p then each alternative in F is ranked below a∗ by two agents of N+ . In total, it is ranked above a∗ by at
least n− p+ K agents while it is ranked below a∗ by at most n− p+ K agents. Again, a∗ cannot be a Condorcet winner. 
This concludes the proof of Theorem 6.4. 
The proof of Theorem 6.4 provides an alternative proof of Theorem 6.1. In terms of the Young score, it implies that,
for every constant  > 0, there are instances for which it is hard to distinguish between a score of zero and a score of at
least n − n . So, for the formulation of the Young score where all the scores are scaled by an additive constant, it provides
additional information which is complementary to the one provided by the proof of Theorem 6.1: it implies that it is hard
to approximate the Young score, even under this alternative formulation, within a factor of O(n).
7. Discussion
Generally speaking, we have taken the following approach: winner determination under the Dodgson and Young voting
rules is intractable, therefore we aim to approximate the Dodgson or Young score. Other goals may seem more natural.
For example, one can ask for a randomized algorithm that selects the winner with high probability, or an algorithm that
selects an alternative that is ranked high by the voting rule in question. Note that our Theorem 5.6 rules out the latter goal.
Nevertheless, a social choice justiﬁcation for approximating a voting rule’s score is called for. Below we concentrate on the
Dodgson score because our positive results concern this rule.
Dodgson’s reasoning in designing his voting rule is a special case of a more general framework called distance ratio-
nalizability, which was proposed by Meskanen and Nurmi [33], and recently received some attention in the AI literature
[13,15,14]. The reasoning behind this framework is that a voting rule should elect an alternative that is closest to being a
consensus winner, according to a natural notion of consensus and a natural notion of distance.
Dodgson’s rule employs a very natural notion of consensus (Condorcet winner) and arguably a natural notion of distance
(number of swaps between adjacent alternatives). These are normative statements, as is common in social choice theory.
However, viewed through the distance rationalizability lens, an approximation of the Dodgson score is simply an approxi-
mation of a natural distance function, much like approximations for other hard problems that involve distances, e.g., facility
location problems. In facility location problems there is a direct connection between distances and the quality of the so-
lution (e.g., the larger the distances, the more costly it would be to build an appropriate infrastructure). Work in progress
by Boutilier and Procaccia suggests that, similarly, in the distance rationalizability framework the distance function can be
proportional to a direct quantitative measure of an alternative’s quality: the closer the alternative is to consensus according
to the distance function, the faster it leads to consensus in a social choice model that involves dynamic preferences, as put
forward by Parkes and Procaccia [35].
Therefore, we can argue that an alternative is increasingly more socially desirable the smaller its Dodgson score, that is,
the score itself is meaningful and not just the Dodgson ranking, and therefore a good approximation of the Dodgson score
may also single out socially desirable winners. Moreover, as argued in Section 4, whenever approximation algorithms satisfy
additional social choice desiderata, they may ultimately be adopted as socially sensible voting rules in their own right.
Interestingly, Dodgson’s rule is considered to be especially ﬂawed from a social choice point of view, and this may be
one of the reasons why it was never employed in real-world decision making. Some well-known voting rules like Copeland
and Maximin are Condorcet-consistent, and in addition avoid the main drawbacks from which Dodgson suffers (e.g., they
are monotonic). Nevertheless, our thesis is that Dodgson approximations can in fact be superior to the original rule, from
both the computational and the social choice points of view, and ultimately may serve as realistic choices for preference
aggregation in human societies and in multiagent systems. The results given above are the starting point of this line of
inquiry; some of us make the point more forcefully in follow-up work [7], which directly builds on the results of this paper.
Acknowledgements
The authors wish to thank Felix Fischer and Nati Linial for helpful discussions. The work was done while Procaccia was at
the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and was supported by the Adams Fellowship Program of the Israel Academy of Sciences
and Humanities. The work of Procaccia and Rosenschein was partially supported by Israel Science Foundation grant #898/05.
The work of Feldman was partially supported by the Israel Science Foundation (grant #1219/09) and by the Leon Recanati
Fund of the Jerusalem school of business administration. The work of Caragiannis, Kaklamanis, and Karanikolas was partially
supported by the European Social Fund and Greek national funds through the Research Funding Program Heracleitus II.
References
[1] N. Ailon, M. Charikar, A. Newman, Aggregating inconsistent information: ranking and clustering, Journal of the ACM 55 (5) (2008) 23.
[2] J. Bartholdi, C.A. Tovey, M.A. Trick, Voting schemes for which it can be diﬃcult to tell who won the election, Social Choice and Welfare 6 (1989)
157–165.
I. Caragiannis et al. / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 187–188 (2012) 31–51 51[3] P. Berman, M. Karpinski, On some tighter inapproximability results, in: Proceedings of the 26th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and
Programming (ICALP), 1999, pp. 200–209.
[4] N. Betzler, J. Guo, R. Niedermeier, Parameterized computational complexity of Dodgson and Young elections, Information and Computation 208 (2)
(2010) 165–177.
[5] D. Black, Theory of Committees and Elections, Cambridge University Press, 1958.
[6] F. Brandt, Some remarks on Dodgson’s voting rule, Mathematical Logic Quarterly 55 (4) (2009) 460–463.
[7] I. Caragiannis, C. Kaklamanis, N. Karanikolas, A.D. Procaccia, Socially desirable approximations for Dodgson’s voting rule, in: Proceedings of the 11th
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC), 2010, pp. 253–262.
[8] V. Conitzer, Computing Slater rankings using similarities among candidates, in: Proceedings of the 21st National Conference on Artiﬁcial Intelligence
(AAAI), 2006, pp. 613–619.
[9] V. Conitzer, A. Davenport, J. Kalagnanam, Improved bounds for computing Kemeny rankings, in: Proceedings of the 21st National Conference on
Artiﬁcial Intelligence (AAAI), 2006, pp. 620–626.
[10] D. Coppersmith, L. Fleischer, A. Rudra, Ordering by weighted number of wins gives a good ranking for weighted tournaments, in: Proceedings of the
17th Annual ACM–SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA), 2006, pp. 776–782.
[11] T.H. Cormen, C.E. Leiserson, R.L. Rivest, C. Stein, Introduction to Algorithms, second edition, MIT Press, 2001.
[12] C. Dwork, R. Kumar, M. Naor, D. Sivakumar, Rank aggregation methods for the web, in: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on World
Wide Web (WWW 01), 2001, pp. 613–622.
[13] E. Elkind, P. Faliszewski, A. Slinko, On distance rationalizability of some voting rules, in: Proceedings of the 12th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of
Rationality and Knowledge (TARK), 2009, pp. 108–117.
[14] E. Elkind, P. Faliszewski, A. Slinko, Good rationalizations of voting rules, in: Proceedings of the 24th AAAI Conference on Artiﬁcial Intelligence (AAAI),
2010, pp. 774–779.
[15] E. Elkind, P. Faliszewski, A. Slinko, On the role of distances in deﬁning voting rules, in: Proceedings of the 9th International Joint Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS), 2010, pp. 375–382.
[16] P. Faliszewski, E. Hemaspaandra, L.A. Hemaspaandra, Multimode control attacks on elections, Journal of Artiﬁcial Intelligence Research 40 (2011) 305–
351.
[17] U. Feige, A threshold of lnn for approximating set cover, Journal of the ACM 45 (4) (1998) 643–652.
[18] P.C. Fishburn, Condorcet social choice functions, SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics 33 (3) (1977) 469–487.
[19] P.C. Fishburn, Monotonicity paradoxes in the theory of elections, Discrete Applied Mathematics 4 (2) (1982) 119–134.
[20] M.R. Garey, D.S. Johnson, Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness, W.H. Freeman and Company, 1979.
[21] S. Ghosh, M. Mundhe, K. Hernandez, S. Sen, Voting for movies: The anatomy of recommender systems, in: Proceedings of the 3rd Annual Conference
on Autonomous Agents (Agents 99), 1999, pp. 434–435.
[22] A. Gibbard, Manipulation of voting schemes, Econometrica 41 (1973) 587–602.
[23] E. Hemaspaandra, L.A. Hemaspaandra, J. Rothe, Exact analysis of Dodgson elections: Lewis Carroll’s 1876 voting system is complete for parallel access
to NP, Journal of the ACM 44 (6) (1997) 806–825.
[24] C. Homan, L.A. Hemaspaandra, Guarantees for the success frequency of an algorithm for ﬁnding Dodgson-election winners, Journal of Heuristics 15 (4)
(2009) 403–423.
[25] M. Karpinski, Approximating bounded degree instances of NP-hard problems, in: Proceedings of the 13th International Symposium on Fundamentals
of Computation Theory (FCT), in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 2138, Springer, 2001, pp. 24–34.
[26] C. Kenyon-Mathieu, W. Schudy, How to rank with few errors, in: Proceedings of the 39th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC),
2007, pp. 95–103.
[27] C. Klamler, A comparison of the Dodgson method and the Copeland rule, Economics Bulletin 4 (8) (2003) 1–7.
[28] C. Klamler, The Dodgson ranking and its relation to Kemeny’s method and Slater’s rule, Social Choice and Welfare 23 (1) (2004) 91–102.
[29] C. Klamler, The Dodgson ranking and the Borda count: a binary comparison, Mathematical Social Sciences 48 (1) (2004) 103–108.
[30] J.C. McCabe-Dansted, Approximability and computational feasibility of Dodgson’s rule, Master’s thesis, University of Auckland, 2006.
[31] J.C. McCabe-Dansted, Dodgson’s rule: Approximations and absurdity, in: Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on Computational Social Choice
(COMSOC), 2008, pp. 371–382.
[32] J.C. McCabe-Dansted, G. Pritchard, A.M. Slinko, Approximability of Dodgson’s rule, Social Choice and Welfare 31 (2) (2008) 311–330.
[33] T. Meskanen, H. Nurmi, Closeness counts in social choice, in: M. Braham, F. Steffen (Eds.), Power, Freedom, and Voting, Springer-Verlag, 2008.
[34] N. Nisan, Introduction to mechanism design (for computer scientists), in: N. Nisan, T. Roughgarden, É. Tardos, V. Vazirani (Eds.), Algorithmic Game
Theory, Cambridge University Press, 2007 (Chapter 9).
[35] D.C. Parkes, A.D. Procaccia, Dynamic social choice: Foundations and algorithms, Manuscript, 2010.
[36] A.D. Procaccia, A. Zohar, Y. Peleg, J.S. Rosenschein, The learnability of voting rules, Artiﬁcial Intelligence 173 (12–13) (2009) 1133–1149.
[37] S. Rajagopalan, V.V. Vazirani, Primal-dual RNC approximation algorithms for set cover and covering integer programs, SIAM Journal on Computing 28
(1999) 526–541.
[38] T.C. Ratliff, A comparison of Dodgson’s method and Kemeny’s rule, Social Choice and Welfare 18 (1) (2001) 79–89.
[39] T.C. Ratliff, A comparison of Dodgson’s method and the Borda count, Economic Theory 20 (2) (2002) 357–372.
[40] R. Raz, S. Safra, A sub-constant error-probability low-degree test, and sub-constant error-probability PCP characterization of NP, in: Proceedings of the
29th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC), 1997, pp. 475–484.
[41] J. Rothe, H. Spakowski, J. Vogel, Exact complexity of the winner problem for Young elections, Theory of Computing Systems 36 (4) (2003) 375–386.
[42] M. Satterthwaite, Strategy-proofness and Arrow’s conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare func-
tions, Journal of Economic Theory 10 (1975) 187–217.
[43] N. Tideman, Collective Decisions and Voting: The Potential for Public Choice, Ashgate, 2006.
[44] V.V. Vazirani, Approximation Algorithms, Springer, 2001.
[45] H.P. Young, Extending Condorcet’s rule, Journal of Economic Theory 16 (1977) 335–353.
